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nterventionist theories of causation have gained wide recognition in the past decade. 
Many philosophers are attracted to the interventionist slogan: “No causation without 
manipulability, no manipulability without causation”.1 Roughly speaking, on an 
interventionist account, X is a (type-level) cause of Y with respect to a variable set V if and 
only if an intervention that changes the value of X would also change the value of Y when all 
other relevant variables in V are held fixed at some value.2 The interventionist approach 
captures an important difference between genuine causation and mere correlation: if X 
causes Y, a proper intervention that changes X would also change Y; if X is merely 
correlated with Y, Y would not change under suitable manipulation of X.3 
 
* This work was supported by the General Research Fund of Hong Kong Research Grants Council (No. 
14613516). I am grateful to an anonymous referee for this JOURNAL for helpful comments on an earlier version 
of this article. Thanks also to Xin Dong, Chang Liu, Yuan Ren, Jiji Zhang, and the audiences of my talks at 
Renmin University and Sun Yat-Sen University for fruitful discussion.  
1 Carl Gillett, “Scientific Emergentism and Its Move beyond (Direct) Downward Causation,” in Michele 
Paoletti and Francesco Orilia, eds., Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation (New York: 
Routledge, 2017), pp. 242–62, at p. 255. See also James Woodward, Making Things Happen: A Theory of Causal 
Explanation (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 61.  
2 See Christopher Hitchcock, “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs,” this 
JOURNAL, XCVIII, 6 (June 2001): 273–99; Christopher Hitchcock, “A Tale of Two Effects,” The Philosophical 
Review, CX, 3 (July 2001): 361–96; Judea Pearl, Causality: Models, Reasoning, and Influence (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000); Lawrence Shapiro, “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, LXXXI, 3 (November 2010): 594–604; Lawrence Shapiro, “Mental Manipulations and the Problem of 
Causal Exclusion,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XC, 3 (September 2012): 507–24; Woodward, Making Things 
Happen, op. cit.; and James Woodward, “Interventionism and Causal Exclusion,” Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, XCI, 2 (September 2015): 303–47. 
3 It is important to note that interventionism should not be regarded as a second-order theory of causation that 
aims to define causation in terms of intervention. Since ‘intervention’ itself is a causal notion, a second-order 
version of interventionism would involve circularity. Hence interventionism should be treated as a first-order 
theory of causation. A first-order version of interventionism is non-circular and informative in that it aims to 
determine whether X causes Y by making use of other sorts of causal knowledge. See James Woodward, 
“Causation and Manipulability,” in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016 
Edition), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/causation-mani/>. 
I 
 2 
Interventionism enjoys some advantages over other difference-making theories of 
causation, such as the Lewisian counterfactual theory.4 An intervention-based account of 
counterfactuals seems to provide a better standard for characterizing causation than does the 
world-similarity approach. For example, interventionism can offer a more satisfactory 
solution to well-known problems with traditional counterfactual theories, such as the 
preemption problem and the overdetermination problem.5 Moreover, I will argue, an 
interventionist account can better deal with supervenient causation than Lewis’s 
counterfactualism. 
A growing number of philosophers are bringing interventionism into the field of 
supervenient causation (and mental causation in particular). In the present context, we are 
concerned with whether supervenient/subvenient properties are causally efficacious, whereas 
interventionist theories typically regard variables as the relata of causal claims. It is harmless, 
however, to assume that properties are binary variables, with the values corresponding to the 
presence or absence of those properties.6 Thus, an interventionist account of property causation 
can be formulated as follows:  
(N) A property X causes another property Y on a particular occasion if and only if  
(N1) If an intervention that sets X = present were to occur, then Y = present; 
 
(N2) If an intervention that sets X = absent were to occur, then Y = absent.7 
 
4 David Lewis, “Causation,” this JOURNAL, LXX, 17 (Oct. 11, 1973): 556–67; and David Lewis, “Causation as 
Influence,” this JOURNAL, XCVII, 4 (April 2000): 182–97. 
5 See Hitchcock, “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs,” op. cit.; and Woodward, 
Making Things Happen, op. cit. 
6 Hitchcock, “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs,” op. cit.; Woodward, Making 
Things Happen, op. cit.; and James Woodward, “Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms,” in Jakob Hohwy and 
Jesper Kallestrup, eds., Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), pp. 218–62. 
7 See Woodward, “Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms,” op. cit.; Christian List and Peter Menzies, 
“Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle,” this JOURNAL, CVI, 9 (September 2009): 
475–502; Shapiro, “Mental Manipulations and the Problem of Causal Exclusion,” op. cit.; and Lei Zhong, 
“Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation,” this JOURNAL, CXI, 7 (July 2014): 341–60. 
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Let us call (N1) the ‘presence condition’, and (N2) the ‘absence condition’.8 When (N1) and 
(N2) hold, we can say that an intervention that changes the values of X would change the 
values of Y accordingly. Within an interventionist framework, this is equivalent to saying that 
property X causes (or is causally relevant to) property Y. 
 In discussing supervenient causation, we can, for the sake of simplicity, consider the 
variable set to consist of only three properties that are actually instantiated on a particular 
occasion: the supervenient property M, the subvenient property P, and the effect property 
E.9 See Figure 1 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Here I wish to stress that multiple realizability is commonly accepted in the literature on 
supervenient causation. On this view, P is only one subvenient property or realizer of M; M 
is also realizable by other lower-level properties, P*, P**, and so on (but they are not actually 
instantiated on this particular occasion).10 In the context of supervenient causation, the 
supervenient property and the subvenient property are assumed to be two distinct 
properties—otherwise it would be pointless to discuss whether the supervenient property 
 
8 As I will discuss later, the two conditions should be interpreted in a proper, non-trivial way. This is relevant to 
how we understand intervention and fixation in the context of supervenient causation. 
9 Many philosophers equate actual causation with token causation. But this is misleading, to say the least. 
Suppose that property M is causally relevant to the occurrence of E on an actual occasion t. This is a case of 
actual causation, and also a case of type causation. 
10 I use the term ‘realizers’ in a minimal sense, interchangeable with ‘subvenient properties’. To say that P is a 
realizer (or subvenient property) of M is, in my terminology, to say that if a system S instantiates P, then 
necessarily S instantiates M. 
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E 
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Figure 1: Supervenient Causation 
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can have causal efficacy apart from the causal powers of its subvenient property. And a 
primary reason why higher-level properties (such as mental properties and biological 
properties) are non-identical with their subvenient properties is that the former are multiply 
realizable by the latter. If M were singly realizable by and hence necessarily coextensive with 
P, it would be difficult to maintain that M and P are two distinct properties.  
Within the interventionist framework, to decide whether M (or P) is the cause of E, 
we should see whether the values of E would change when an intervention changes the 
values of M (or P).11 But the crucial question is: What kind of intervention is suitable in the 
case of supervenient causation? Specifically, should we hold P (or M) fixed while intervening 
on M (or P), and, if yes, in what way?  
In the literature, many argue that interventionist supervenient causation is exempted 
from the fixability condition. However, this approach looks ad hoc, inconsistent with the 
general interventionist requirement on fixation. Moreover, it leads to false judgments about 
the causal efficacy of supervenient/subvenient properties. This article aims to clear up some 
common misunderstandings and to develop a novel interventionist account of supervenient 
causation. I argue that a suitable intervention on supervenient/subvenient properties should 
hold the other variables fixed at some value. The treatment of intervention and fixation that 
I propose can accommodate the proportionality constraint on causation and deliver correct 
causal verdicts in some classic examples. It is also worth noting that this interventionist 
account offers a promising defense of mental causation without postulating mental-physical 
overdetermination. 
 
 
11 To be more accurate, we are deciding whether M (or P) is the direct cause of E. Woodward makes a 
distinction between direct causes and contributing causes, and defines the latter in terms of the former. See 
Woodward, Making Things Happen, op. cit., p. 59. But this distinction does not matter in the current context. 
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I. SUPERVENIENT CAUSATION AND THE FIXABILITY CONDITION 
According to the classic version of interventionism, in deciding whether X is a (direct) cause 
of Y with respect to a variable set V, we should consider an intervention that changes X and 
at the same time holds fixed all other variables in V.12 But classic interventionism did not 
intend to accommodate cases of supervenient causation. Given the supervenience 
relationship, it seems impossible to perform a suitable intervention on a supervenient 
property that could at the same time hold fixed its subvenient base. If so, it would follow 
that a supervenient property can never cause anything.13 This is what I call the Fixability 
Argument against supervenient causation: 
1. There is no suitable intervention on M while holding P fixed; 
 
2. If there is no suitable intervention on M while holding P fixed, M is not a cause 
of E; 
 
3. Therefore, M is not a cause of E. 
 
We do not want to accept the conclusion. A theory of causation should allow the possibility 
that supervenient properties can exert causal powers on some occasions. If any account of 
causation conceptually rules out the causal efficacy of supervenient properties, that is simply a 
reductio of the theory. To save supervenient causation, one needs to deny either Premise 1 or 
2. It is striking to see that most interventionists take Premise 1 for granted and attempt to 
reject Premise 2. They thus later revise or develop their interventionist accounts to 
accommodate supervenient causation—on those updated versions, it is no longer required 
that P be held fixed while intervening on M. James Woodward puts it this way: 
[W]hen an intervention occurs on X, its supervenience base SB(X) should not 
be regarded as one of those “off route causes” in IV that one needs to control 
for or hold fixed in intervening on X… In assessing whether X is a direct cause 
 
12 Ibid. 
13 Michael Baumgartner, “Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, XL, 3 
(September 2010): 359–83. 
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of Y, the “other variables” in V that we should hold fixed independently of 
the intervention on X should not include the supervenience base for X.14 
 
And Lawrence Shapiro holds a similar view: 
 
When investigating whether a supervening property is a cause, one must not 
ask whether the supervening property has causal influence in addition to the 
causal influence of its base. This question suggests the wrong kind of test, i.e. 
a test in which the base is held fixed while the supervening property is 
changed.15 
 
However, this popular approach incurs theoretical costs. The exemption of fixability seems 
ad hoc, and is inconsistent with the general interventionist framework. Moreover, as I will 
argue later, this approach leads to false judgments on the causal efficacy of 
supervenient/subvenient properties. In contrast, I adopt an unpopular but more promising 
approach, which grants Premise 2 but challenges Premise 1. I will argue, for multiple 
theoretical reasons, that P should be held fixed while intervening on M.  
Why do those philosophers believe that there is no suitable intervention on M while 
holding P fixed? They may have two reasons. First, some seem to understand P as the whole 
supervenience base of M, which consists of all subvenient properties or realizers of M. P is 
thus taken as a many-valued variable, and each value corresponds to an individual realizer of 
M. This explains why interventionists often make the following claims: “every change in the 
values of M is necessarily accompanied by a change in the values of P”;16 “because M supervenes 
on P, changing M while holding P fixed is impossible”;17 “for all values of M, the value of M 
cannot change without a change in the value of P”;18 and so on. Certainly, if P were the whole 
supervenience base of M, it would be metaphysically impossible to hold P fixed while intervening 
 
14 Woodward, “Interventionism and Causal Exclusion,” op. cit., pp. 333–4. 
15 Shapiro, “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” op. cit., p. 601. 
16 Baumgartner, “Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism,” op. cit., p. 369. 
17 Shapiro, “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” op. cit., p. 600. 
18 Woodward, “Interventionism and Causal Exclusion,” op. cit., p. 309. 
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on M. On the one hand, if M were absent under any intervention whatsoever, P would also 
be absent. On the other hand, if M were present under an intervention, then P would be 
present as well.  
Nevertheless, it is problematic to understand P as the whole supervenience base of 
M, which is in fact an indefinite or even infinite disjunction of diverse subvenient properties. 
Many philosophers argue that such a disjunctive “property” is not a genuine property.19 
What is more important is that, regardless of whether they are real properties, such 
disjunctive properties are unsuitable relata for any sort of causal relation.20 According to our 
common understanding of causation, an event c causes another event e in virtue of certain 
individual properties that are instantiated by c and e, but not in virtue of some disjunctive 
properties the disjuncts of which include those individual properties. Hence the problem of 
supervenient causation is concerned with whether a supervenient property can exert 
distinctive causal powers over and above their individual subvenient properties on at least 
some occasions.  
Therefore, P should be understood as an individual subvenient property or realizer 
of M. If P is only an individual subvenient property of M, it is not the case that every time 
the values of M change, the values of P also change—strictly speaking, M does not supervene 
upon the individual realizer P (supposing that M is multiply realizable).21 So, it is possible to 
intervene on M while holding fixed P at some value, that is, absence. While holding fixed P = 
absent, we can set M to be either present or absent (given multiple realizability). At first sight, 
 
19 See, for example, D. M. Armstrong, A Theory of Universals: Universals and Scientific Realism (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1978); and Paul Audi, “How to Rule out Disjunctive Properties,” Noûs, XLVII, 4 
(December 2013): 748–66. 
20 See David Lewis, “New Work for a Theory of Universals,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, LXI, 4 (December 
1983): 343–77. 
21 If F supervenes on G, then there cannot be an F-difference without a G-difference. But if P is only one of 
the multiple realizers of M, there could be an M-difference without a P-difference. For example, two systems 
that have no P—they are thus identical with respect to P—could be different with respect to M. 
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my view that it is possible to intervene on M while holding fixed its actual realizer is 
compatible with other interventionists’ claim that it is impossible to intervene on M while 
holding fixed all the realizers. However, our disagreements lie at a deeper level. As I will 
discuss in the next section, different interventionist approaches on what variables should be 
fixed will yield different causal verdicts. 
It is worth noticing that absence is the counterfactual value of P. We already suppose 
that M and P are actually instantiated on a given occasion. Presence is thus the actual value of 
P. When some philosophers talk about holding fixed other variables, they are inclined to 
understand this as holding fixed other variables at their actual values, which is a natural and default 
reading of fixation. Since P is a supervenient property of M, we cannot intervene on M while 
holding P fixed at its actual value presence. When an intervention sets M = absent, P must take 
the counterfactual value absence. As Shapiro says, “The proposition ‘P & ~M’ is impossible. P 
cannot be present while M is absent”.22 This is the second reason why some believe that 
there is no suitable intervention on M while holding P fixed. 
However, this reason does not withstand careful examination. Although in many 
cases we should hold the variables fixed at their actual values,23 there are some cases in 
which the counterfactual values should be held fixed instead. Consider a case of symmetric 
overdetermination (see Figure 2). Suppose that two assassins’ shootings result in a victim’s 
death. The two shootings are set up in such a way that either would have killed the victim 
even if the other had failed. Thus, the death of the victim (D) is causally overdetermined by 
 
22 Shapiro, “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” op. cit., p. 600. 
23 Consider an example of joint causation. Suppose that the striking of a match and the presence of oxygen 
jointly cause the lighting of the match. While holding oxygen fixed at the counterfactual value absence, lighting 
will not occur regardless of whether striking is present or absent. This would deliver a false verdict that striking 
is not a cause of lighting. However, supervenient causation is clearly not a case of joint causation. For more 
discussion, see Jaegwon Kim, Mind in a Physical World: An Essay on the Mind-Body Problem and Mental Causation 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); and Jaegwon Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005). 
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the two shootings (C1 and C2). If we hold C1 (or C2) fixed at the actual value presence, 
interventions on C2 (or C1) will not change the effect D. That would deliver a false verdict 
that neither C1 nor C2 is the cause of D. This is why some philosophers suggest that we hold 
C1 (or C2) fixed at their counterfactual values in intervening on C2 (or C1).24 While holding C2 
fixed at the counterfactual value absence, C1 = present would lead to D = present, and C1 = 
absent would lead to D = absent. It thus follows that C1 is a cause of D. Similar reasoning 
would establish that C2 is also a cause of D. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Since there are some cases in which we should hold the variables fixed at their counterfactual 
values, why not in the case of supervenient causation?25 Whereas in many cases we can hold 
the variables fixed at either their actual values or counterfactual values, it is impossible to 
hold the subvenient property fixed at its actual value while intervening on the supervenient 
property—we can hold P fixed only at its counterfactual value while intervening on M. We 
have a prima facie reason to hold P fixed at the counterfactual value absence, because this is the 
only way to satisfy the general interventionist requirement that a suitable intervention should 
 
24 Hitchcock, “The Intransitivity of Causation Revealed in Equations and Graphs,” op. cit.; and Woodward, 
Making Things Happen, op. cit. 
25 For the purposes of this article, I do not have to provide a unifying account to accommodate all and only 
cases in which holding the variables fixed at their counterfactual values should be allowed. I only need to argue 
that we should hold the subvenient property fixed at its counterfactual value while intervening on the 
supervenient property. 
 
C2 
 
 
D 
 
C1 
Figure 2:  Symmetric Overdetermination 
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hold all other variables fixed at some value. Moreover, I will argue that holding P fixed at 
absence would deliver correct and interesting verdicts on supervenient causation. 
II. INTERVENTION, FIXATION, AND THE PROPORTIONALITY CONSTRAINT 
Fixing P at the counterfactual value absence has significant theoretical advantages. This 
account of fixation not only respects the general requirements of interventionism, but also 
accommodates the Proportionality Constraint on Causation, according to which the cause should 
be proportional—neither too general nor too specific—to the effect.26 Consider two examples:  
[SOPHIE] The pigeon Sophie is conditioned to peck at and only at red objects. On a 
particular occasion, Sophie sees a scarlet (also red) object and then pecks at it. Which 
property, red or scarlet, is the cause of Sophie’s pecking? (Figure 3) 
 
[ALICE] The pigeon Alice is conditioned to peck at and only at scarlet objects. On a 
particular occasion, Alice sees a scarlet (also red) object and then pecks at it. Which 
property, red or scarlet, is the cause of Alice’s pecking? (Figure 4)27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On the one hand, in the Sophie case, red seems more suitable than scarlet to be the cause of 
pecking.28 As long as an object is red, Sophie will peck at the object, regardless of whether it 
 
26 See, for example, List and Menzies, “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle,” 
op. cit.; and Stephen Yablo, “Mental Causation,” The Philosophical Review, CI, 2 (April 1992): 245–80. 
27 The two pigeon examples are borrowed respectively from Yablo, “Mental Causation,” op. cit.; and Sydney 
Shoemaker, Identity, Cause, and Mind (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
28 Here we are concerned with which property, red or scarlet, is causally relevant to pecking. It is safe to say 
that red and scarlet are two different properties, regardless of whether they could be instantiated by the same 
event. 
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is scarlet. Scarlet is thus too specific to be the cause of Sophie’s pecking.29 On the other hand, 
in the Alice example, scarlet rather than red should be regarded as the cause of pecking. 
Alice will not peck at a red object if it is not also scarlet. In other words, red is overly general 
for being the cause of Alice’s pecking.30  
The proportionality constraint is a reasonable idea shared by many philosophers, and 
the two pigeon examples give a very good illustration of this idea. The main thesis of this 
paper is not to argue for proportionality; that is beyond the scope of this article.31 In what 
follows, I would like to show how my particular approach to supervenient causation and the 
proportionality intuition can mutually support each other. 
Let us return to the two pigeon examples. While holding fixed scarlet at the 
counterfactual value absence, we perform interventions that change the values of red. Then we 
see whether the values of pecking would change accordingly. Consider SOPHIE first. Within 
my interventionist framework, red is the cause of Sophie’s pecking if and only if the 
following two conditionals are true: 
(S1) If an intervention sets RED = present (while holding SCARLET fixed at absence), 
then SOPHIE’S PECKING = present; 
 
 
29 Lewis, “Causation,” op. cit.; Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” op. cit.; List and Menzies, “Nonreductive 
Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle,” op. cit.; Panu Raatikainen, “Causation, Exclusion, and 
the Special Sciences,” Erkenntnis, LXXIII, 3 (November 2010): 349–63; Yablo, “Mental Causation,” op. cit.; 
Zhong, “Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation,” op. cit.; and Lei Zhong, “Semantic Normativity 
and Semantic Causality,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, XCIV, 3 (May 2017): 626–45. 
30 List and Menzies, “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle,” op. cit.; Yablo, 
“Mental Causation,” op. cit.; Zhong, “Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation,” op. cit.; and Zhong, 
“Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality,” op. cit. 
31 Some philosophers maintain that proportionality only matters to explanation rather than causation. See, for 
example, Neil McDonnell, “Causal Exclusion and the Limits of Proportionality,” Philosophical Studies, CLXXIV, 6 
(June 2017): 1459–74; and Brad Weslake, “Proportionality, Contrast and Explanation,” Australasian Journal of 
Philosophy, XCI, 4 (December 2013): 785–97. On their view, both red and scarlet are the cause of Sophie’s 
pecking, although red figures in a better causal explanation of why Sophie pecks at the object. However, the 
separation of causation from causal explanation is unconvincing. Facts about causal explanation are grounded 
in facts about causation. If red plays a genuinely better causal explanatory role than scarlet does in the SOPHIE 
case, this is probably because red is more suitable than scarlet to be the cause of Sophie’s pecking. 
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(S2) If an intervention sets RED = absent (while holding SCARLET fixed at absence), 
then SOPHIE’S PECKING = absent.32 
 
By assumption, Sophie is conditioned to peck at all red objects. That is, whenever red is 
present (even if the color is not scarlet), Sophie’s pecking will always occur. Thus, (S1) is 
true. On the other hand, Sophie is conditioned to peck at only red objects. If an object is not 
red, Sophie will not peck at it. (S2) is also true. Therefore, red is the cause of Sophie’s 
pecking. 
Is red also the cause of Alice’s pecking? Consider the following two conditionals: 
(A1) If an intervention sets RED = present (while holding SCARLET fixed at absence), 
then ALICE’S PECKING = present; 
 
(A2) If an intervention sets RED = absent (while holding SCARLET fixed at absence), 
then ALICE’S PECKING = absent. 
 
Alice is conditioned to peck at only scarlet objects. If an object is not scarlet, Alice will not 
peck at it. So, whereas (A2) is true, (A1) is false. Suppose that Alice were to see a crimson 
object under interventions (this is a case in which RED = present but SCARLET = absent). In 
that situation, Alice would not peck at the object, even though it was red. That is to say, (A1) 
is not satisfied. Therefore, red does not cause Alice’s pecking. 
As I mentioned earlier, the interventionist account of property causation (N) consists 
of two conditions: the presence condition (N1) and the absence condition (N2). While some 
theories of causation only focus on the presence condition,33 other theories merely 
 
32 Someone might say that if scarlet is not on a causal path to pecking in the SOPHIE case, we do not need to 
hold scarlet fixed while intervening on red. However, whether the supervenient/subvenient property is causally 
relevant to the effect is precisely what is at issue in the supervenient causation debate. It is inappropriate to 
assume that scarlet does not cause Sophie’s pecking, before we offer interventionist diagnosis. On my approach, 
scarlet and red are treated as competing causal candidates, and therefore one should be held fixed while 
intervening on the other regardless of whether it is SOPHIE or ALICE. But even if scarlet is held fixed while 
intervening on red in the SOPHIE case, a change in the values of red would still lead to a change in the values of 
pecking. 
33 See Phil Dowe, Physical Causation (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000); and Wesley Salmon, 
Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
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emphasize the absence condition.34 However, both conditions are significant and should be 
interpreted in a non-trivial way for the sake of providing a plausible account of causation. 
The absence condition can disallow putative causes that are not general enough, and the 
presence condition can rule out inadequately specific causes.35 The account of intervention 
and fixation that I propose can provide a suitable interpretation of the two conditions. 
What if we do not hold fixed scarlet while intervening on red? Given that scarlet is a 
subvenient property of red, the only situation in which we intervene on red without holding 
scarlet fixed is this: (1) when an intervention sets RED = present, the other variable SCARLET 
= present; and (2) when an intervention sets RED = absent, the other variable SCARLET = 
absent. If so, the two interventionist conditions would be met (regardless of whether it is the 
SOPHIE case or the ALICE case). First, the presence condition is satisfied in a trivial way. 
When the other variable SCARLET = present, RED = present will lead to PECKING = present. 
Second, the absence condition is also satisfied. When the other variable SCARLET = absent, 
RED = absent will lead to PECKING = absent. Thus, we would come to an absurd conclusion 
that red causes pecking not only in SOPHIE but also in ALICE.  
So, if we do not hold fixed the subvenient property while intervening on the 
supervenient property, we would get an overly optimistic account of supervenient causation, 
 
34 See Lewis, “Causation,” op. cit.; and Lewis, “Causation as Influence,” op. cit. See also Thomas Kroedel, “A 
Simple Argument for Downward Causation,” Synthese, CXCII, 3 (March 2015): 841–58. Lewis’s world-similarity 
criteria are committed to Strong Centering, which asserts that the actual world is closer to itself than any other 
possible world. Given Strong Centering, it is trivially true that if C had occurred, E would have occurred 
(where C and E are two actual events or property instances). So, for Lewis, the presence condition 
on causation is insignificant; his theory of causation is thus primarily concerned with the absence 
condition “if C had not occurred, E would not have occurred.” Many suggest that we should adopt a 
weaker centering assumption for various theoretical considerations (see, for example, List and Menzies, 
“Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle,” op. cit.). It is important to note that 
Strong Centering does not hold in the interventionist framework (see Woodward, “Causation and Manipulability,” 
op. cit.). 
35 (N) does not logically entail the proportionality constraint—whether (N) delivers the proportionality 
constraint depends upon how we understand intervention and fixation. But interventionism seems to have 
more theoretical resources than other theories of causation to accommodate the proportionality constraint. 
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which fails to differentiate between the two kinds of cases (SOPHIE vs. ALICE). In contrast, 
my interventionist account of supervenient causation is neither pessimistic nor cheap. 
According to my theory, supervenient properties can have causal powers in some cases but 
not in other cases.  
III. THE CAUSAL EFFICACY OF SUBVENIENT PROPERTIES 
Interventionists are mainly concerned with whether supervenient properties have causal 
powers. They have not explicitly discussed the causal efficacy of subvenient properties within 
the interventionist framework. Perhaps they take it for granted that subvenient properties are 
causally efficacious. Suppose that we are now deciding whether P is the cause of E. What 
kind of intervention should we adopt? Should we hold M fixed while intervening on P? Or, 
as in the pigeon examples, should we hold red fixed (at some value) while intervening on 
scarlet?  
I contend that we should hold red fixed at its actual value presence while intervening 
on scarlet. Although this way of fixation—holding red fixed at the actual value—is 
apparently different from the proposal mentioned in the previous section (that is, holding 
scarlet fixed at its counterfactual value), the underlying rationale is the same. Holding red 
fixed at presence is the only way to satisfy the general interventionist requirement on fixation. 
If we take both the absence and presence conditions into account, red cannot be held fixed 
at absence in intervening on scarlet. Moreover, this way of intervention and fixation will 
deliver correct causal verdicts. 
Consider ALICE first. Within my interventionist framework, scarlet is the cause of 
Alice’s pecking if and only if the following two conditionals are true: 
(A3) If an intervention sets SCARLET = present (while holding RED fixed at presence), 
then ALICE’S PECKING = present; 
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(A4) If an intervention sets SCARLET = absent (while holding RED fixed at presence), 
then ALICE’S PECKING = absent. 
 
By assumption, Alice is conditioned to pick at all scarlet objects. That is, if scarlet is present, 
Alice will always peck. Thus, (A3) is true. On the other hand, Alice is conditioned to pick at 
only scarlet objects. If an object is not scarlet (even if it is still red), Alice will not peck at it. 
(A4) is also true. Therefore, scarlet is the cause of Alice’s pecking. 
Is scarlet also the cause of Sophie’s pecking? Consider the following two 
conditionals: 
(S3) If an intervention sets SCARLET = present (while holding RED fixed at presence), 
then SOPHIE’S PECKING = present; 
 
(S4) If an intervention sets SCARLET = absent (while holding RED fixed at presence), 
then SOPHIE’S PECKING = absent. 
 
Sophie is conditioned to peck at all red objects. As long as an object is red (regardless of 
whether it is scarlet), Sophie will peck at it. So, whereas (S3) is true, (S4) is false. Suppose 
that Sophie sees a crimson object under an intervention (this is a case in which SCARLET = 
absent but RED = present). In that situation, Sophie will still peck at the object, even though it 
is not scarlet. That is to say, the absence condition is not satisfied. Therefore, scarlet is not 
the cause of Sophie’s pecking. 
Some philosophers only focus on the presence condition. Whenever scarlet is 
present, pecking is also present, regardless of whether it is the ALICE case or the SOPHIE 
case. However, we should take both conditions seriously. Consider a similar example. 
Suppose that a palm tree would be broken if the wind speed reaches 60 MPH or more. On a 
particular occasion, the wind speed reaches 75 MPH, and the palm tree is broken. But which 
property is causally relevant: the wind’s blowing at more than 60 MPH, or the wind’s 
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blowing at 75 MPH?36 It seems reasonable to say that the former rather than the latter is the 
cause. Although blowing at 75 MPH satisfies the presence condition, it fails to meet the 
absence condition. Likewise, scarlet is not the cause of Sophie’s pecking, as the absence 
condition is not satisfied. 
But, if we do not hold fixed red while intervening on scarlet, the absence condition 
would be met in a trivial way. Because scarlet is a subvenient property of red, the only way to 
intervene on scarlet without holding red fixed is this: (1) when an intervention sets SCARLET 
= present, the other variable RED = present; and (2) when an intervention sets SCARLET = 
absent, the other variable RED = absent. On the one hand, the presence condition would be 
satisfied. Supposing that the other variable RED = present, if SCARLET = present, then 
PECKING = present. On the other hand, the absence condition would be (trivially) satisfied. 
Given that RED = absent, if SCARLET = absent, then PECKING = absent. Thus, it follows that 
scarlet is the cause of pecking in both SOPHIE and ALICE. While intervening on red without 
holding fixed scarlet provides a trivial interpretation of the presence condition, intervening on 
scarlet without holding fixed red gives a trivial reading of the absence condition.  
It is worth noticing that my interventionist explanation of why scarlet is not the 
cause of Sophie’s pecking is different from the traditional counterfactualist approach that 
adopts Lewis’s world-similarity criteria. Some philosophers would say that scarlet is not the 
cause of Sophie’s pecking because the counterfactual ‘if scarlet had not occurred, then 
Sophie would not have pecked’ is false.37 Why is it false? According to the counterfactualist, 
the closest possible world in which scarlet is absent is a world in which another shade of red 
(say, crimson) is somehow present, and Sophie still pecks.  
 
36 The two properties are distinct properties, although they may be instantiated by the same event (supposing 
that we adopt a coarse-grained conception of events). 
37 List and Menzies, “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle,” op. cit. 
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However, it is controversial to claim that the closest possible world in which scarlet 
is absent must be one in which another shade of red is present. For the sake of argument, 
suppose that in the actual world the objects that can be presented to Sophie consist mainly 
of non-red (green, blue, yellow, and so forth) objects. Sophie is conditioned to pick at all and 
only red objects. On a particular occasion, Sophie sees a scarlet object and then pecks at it. 
But, if counterfactually the scarlet object did not occur, there would be a non-red object 
presented to Sophie. So, the closest world in which scarlet is absent is a possible world in 
which red is also absent. Hence it follows that the counterfactual ‘if scarlet had not occurred, 
then Sophie would not have pecked’ is true. But is scarlet the cause of Sophie’s pecking in 
this scenario? It seems not. The question of whether scarlet is the cause of Sophie’s pecking 
does not hinge on the truth of counterfactuals that are evaluated in terms of world similarity. 
Instead, we should appeal to interventionist counterfactuals like (S3) and (S4) to determine 
whether scarlet is the cause of pecking. If an intervention that sets scarlet to be absent (while 
holding red fixed) would still lead to the presence of pecking, scarlet should not be regarded 
as the cause of Sophie’s pecking, even though some world in which scarlet is absent and 
pecking is also absent is closer to the actual world than any world in which scarlet is absent 
and pecking is present. Thus, an interventionist account can better deal with supervenient 
causation than Lewis’s counterfactualism. 
     
        
       
 
  
According to Zhong (2014, p. 356), when an intervention sets scarlet to absent, 
and red is held at present, a third variable, crimson, may also change value (to 
 In the last part of  this section, I want to consider a possible objection to my view. 
Notice that if  we set scarlet to be absent while holding fixed red at presence, a new realizer of  
red (say, crimson) will be present. Somephilosophersmight maintain that this kind of
intervention violates the original framework of  interventionism. For example, Neil 
McDonnell writes:
 18 
present). Crimson, in this case, is an off-path variable which Woodward’s 
definition of an intervention (2003, p. 98) states should be held fixed when 
considering the causal role of scarlet (to rule it out as a confounding variable).38 
 
However, it is incorrect to say that crimson is a confounding variable. In the ALICE case, an 
intervention that sets scarlet = absent while holding red fixed at presence would change the 
values of pecking (from presence to absence), regardless of whether red is realized by crimson or 
ruby or vermilion… In the SOPHIE case, an intervention that sets scarlet = absent while 
holding red fixed at presence would not change the values of pecking, whether red is realized 
by crimson or not. In either case, crimson should not be considered as a confounder. 
Here we are faced with two choices on intervention: (1) an intervention that makes 
both scarlet and red absent; or alternatively (2) an intervention that makes scarlet absent but 
keeps red present. Some may fail to realize that the values of some variables would change 
under either intervention. Certainly, if we perform intervention (2), then the values of 
crimson will change, from the actual value absence to the counterfactual value presence. But if 
we perform intervention (1) the values of red will also change, from the actual value presence 
to the counterfactual value absence. Which intervention is a suitable intervention? I think we 
should choose (2) for two reasons. 
First, as I have argued thus far, the second kind of intervention (2) would deliver 
correct causal judgments. My proposed account of intervention and fixation can 
accommodate not only cases in which subvenient rather than supervenient properties are 
causally responsible for the effects (such as the ALICE case), but also cases in which 
supervenient rather than subvenient properties are the real causes (such as the SOPHIE case). 
But, if we adopt the first sort of intervention (1), it would lead to a mistaken view that 
subvenient properties are always causally efficacious. 
 
38 McDonnell, “Causal Exclusion and the Limits of Proportionality,” op. cit., p. 1467. 
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Second, intervention (2) is more coherent with the general interventionist framework 
than intervention (1) is. In the pigeon examples, two competing causal candidates (red and 
scarlet) are instantiated on a particular occasion. To determine whether one variable is the 
cause, we should intervene on it while holding the other variable fixed at some value. But 
crimson is not actually instantiated on this occasion—it is not presented in the causal graphs 
(Figures 3 & 4). Since we cannot hold both red and crimson fixed, holding fixed the 
instantiated property red should be given the priority. I admit that this is different from a 
case of non-supervenient causation (such as the case of symmetric overdetermination) in 
which intervening on one variable while holding fixed the other variable will not bring about 
a new variable. Nevertheless, given the supervenience relationship, if we set scarlet to be 
absent while holding red fixed at presence, this must make a third variable, say crimson, 
present. But this difference seems irrelevant to the question of which instantiated property, 
red or scarlet, is the cause of pecking.  
IV. COMPATIBILISM, EXCLUSIONISM, AND INTERACTIONISM 
A significant theoretical upshot of my interventionist account of supervenient causation is 
that it can shed some light on mental causation. Specifically, this account will offer a 
distinctive and promising solution to the exclusion problem, the most powerful challenge to 
non-reductive physicalism.39 Consider a standard formulation of the Exclusion Argument: 
1. [CLOSURE] Every physical effect has a sufficient physical cause (at any time at 
which it has a cause)—that is, every physical event is caused by another physical 
event solely in virtue of physical properties.  
 
2. [EFFICACY] Some physical effects have mental causes—that is, some physical 
events are caused by mental events in virtue of mental properties. 
 
 
39 Kim, Mind in a Physical World, op. cit.; and Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, op. cit. 
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3. [EXCLUSION] It is not the case that mental properties and physical properties 
causally overdetermine the same effects in a systematic way.40 
 
4. [IDENTITY] Therefore, mental properties are identical with physical properties.41 
 
Let us return to Figure 1. Suppose that M is a mental property, P is a physical subvenient 
property of M, and E is another physical property. According to CLOSURE, P is the cause of 
E. According to EFFICACY, E is also caused by M. Given EXCLUSION, M and P could not 
both cause E if they were distinct from each other. Thus, it follows that M is identical with 
P.  
Most philosophers do not accept the IDENTITY conclusion and raise various 
objections to the exclusion argument. This argument seems valid, but is it sound? A popular 
solution to the exclusion problem is the so-called Compatibilist approach, which attempts to 
refute the EXCLUSION premise.42 In contrast, alternative approaches that accept EXCLUSION 
can be labelled as Exclusionism. Compatibilism proposes that mental and physical properties 
systematically overdetermine the physical effects: while P is a sufficient physical cause of E, 
M is another sufficient cause—or at least part of another sufficient cause—of E.43  
It is worth noticing that some interventionists adopt the compatibilist approach as 
well. For example, Shapiro says that “Because changing M is impossible without 
 
40 Here I use the term ‘causal overdetermination’ in a broad sense: to say that A and B causally overdetermine 
the effect E is just to say that A and B are two distinct and sufficient causes of E. 
41 For the purpose of establishing a robust version of reductive physicalism, the exclusion argument is standardly 
formulated in terms of mental properties rather than mental events. 
42 See Karen Bennett, “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable, and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It,” 
Noûs, XXXVII, 3 (September 2003): 471–97; Barry Loewer, “Mental Causation, or Something Near Enough,” in 
Brian McLaughlin and Jonathan Cohen, eds., Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007), pp. 243–64; Jonathan Schaffer, “Overdetermining Causes,” Philosophical Studies, CXIV, 1–2 (May 2003): 
23–45; Sydney Shoemaker, Physical Realization (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Theodore Sider, 
“What’s So Bad about Overdetermination?,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LXVII, 3 (November 2003): 
719–26; and Jessica Wilson, “Non-reductive Realization and the Powers-based Subset Strategy,” The Monist, 
XCIV, 1 (January 2011): 121–54. 
43 Mental-physical overdetermination is sometimes simplified as the case in which the mental property (M) and 
the physical subvenient property (P) are two distinct and sufficient causes of the same effect (E). But we should 
note that the compatibilist does not have to say that M alone is another sufficient cause of E—she only needs to 
make the weaker claim that M is part of another sufficient cause of E. 
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simultaneously changing M’s supervenience base P, and because P is a cause of P*, a change 
in M does result in a change in P*. This is evidence that M is a cause of P*.”44 Woodward also 
contends that we should treat both the mental property M1 and the physical realizer P1 as 
causing another physical effect P2.45 
However, compatibilism strikes many as highly problematic. In the compatibilist 
picture, “mental properties look like freeloaders, merely piggybacking on the real bearers of 
causal powers”.46 Given that the mental ontologically depends upon the physical, mental-
physical overdetermination is a model of dependent overdetermination. This is different from 
the case of symmetric overdetermination in which the two sufficient causes of the effect are 
metaphysically independent of each other: even if one cause had not occurred, the other cause 
would have still occurred (see Figure 2).47 Jaegwon Kim puts it this way: 
In standard cases of overdetermination, like two bullets hitting the victim’s 
heart at the same time, the short circuit and the overturned lantern causing a 
house fire, and so on, each overdetermining cause plays a distinct and 
distinctive causal role. The usual notion of overdetermination involves two or 
more separate and independent causal chains intersecting at a common effect. 
Because of supervenience, however, that is not the kind of situation we have 
here. In this sense, this is not a case of genuine causal overdetermination.48 
 
My interventionist account offers a straightforward and unifying justification of Kim’s 
intuition that while symmetric overdetermination is intelligible, dependent overdetermination 
is dubious. Consider a case of symmetric overdetermination. Two shootings (C1 and C2) are 
followed by the death of the victim (D). To determine whether C1 is a cause of D, we 
intervene upon C1 while holding C2 fixed at some value (namely, at the counterfactual value 
 
44 Shapiro, “Lessons from Causal Exclusion,” op. cit., p. 601. 
45 Woodward, “Interventionism and Causal Exclusion,” op. cit. 
46 David Robb and John Heil, “Mental Causation,” in Edward Zalta, ed., The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
(Winter 2018 Edition), URL = < https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/mental-causation/>. 
47 Some philosophers use the term ‘overdetermination’ roughly in the sense of independent 
overdetermination—in a narrower sense than I do. See, for example, Bennett, “Why the Exclusion Problem 
Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It,” op. cit.  
48 Kim, Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, op. cit., p. 48. 
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absence). Then we find that C1 = present leads to D = present, and C1 = absent leads to D = 
absent. The presence and absence conditions are satisfied. It thus follows that C1 is a cause of 
D. A similar reasoning would establish that C2 is also a cause of D. C1 and C2 causally 
overdetermine D, because an intervention on either C1 or C2 will change D (when one holds 
the other variables fixed).  
But neither ALICE nor SOPHIE is like this. There is only one variable (red or scarlet, 
but not both) on which a suitable intervention will change the values of pecking. Consider 
ALICE first. If we intervene on scarlet while holding red fixed (at presence), we will find that 
(1) if SCARLET = present, then PECKING = present; and (2) if SCARLET = absent, then PECKING 
= absent. Scarlet is a cause of Alice’s pecking. On the other hand, if we intervene on red while 
holding scarlet fixed at absence, PECKING = absent regardless of whether RED = present or 
absent. Thus, red is not a cause of Alice’s pecking. While there is an intervention on scarlet 
that will change the values of Alice’s pecking, there is no intervention on red that can change 
Alice’s pecking (supposing that the other variables are held fixed). That is to say, red and 
scarlet do not causally overdetermine Alice’s pecking. Similarly, we can establish that SOPHIE 
is not a case of causal overdetermination either. Although a suitable intervention on red will 
change the values of Sophie’s pecking, no proper intervention on scarlet can change Sophie’s 
pecking. 
Compatibilists often say that given the close relationship between the mental and the 
physical (supervenience, realization, determinable/determinate, and so forth), their causal 
powers do not compete with each other—mental properties rather “inherit” the causal 
efficacy of physical properties.49 This claim is, however, unconvincing. As I have argued, 
 
49 See Bennett, “Why the Exclusion Problem Seems Intractable and How, Just Maybe, to Tract It,” op. cit.; 
Shoemaker, Physical Realization, op. cit.; and Wilson, “Non-reductive Realization and the Powers-based Subset 
Strategy,” op. cit. 
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although red and scarlet hold such a close relationship, the determinable/determinate 
relation, they still causally compete with each other. Either the supervenient property red is 
the cause (as in the SOPHIE example) or the subvenient property scarlet is the cause (as in 
the ALICE example), but not both—this is not a case of causal overdetermination. 
Thus, an interventionist account of supervenient causation understood properly will 
favor exclusionism over compatibilism. But even though exclusionism is true—even though 
the mental and the physical causally compete with each other—there is a further question to 
be answered: Is the mental-physical correlation like the SOPHIE case or the ALICE case? 
Consider an example. I was in pain and hence started groaning. Suppose that the property of 
having such and such neurons firing in the anterior cortex (call this property ‘P’) is the 
particular realizer of my pain in this case. But there are many other similar properties that 
can also realize pain. Will a person still groan when her pain is realized by a different physical 
property? Or is the groaning behavior only sensitive to the particular realizer P?50 
Let me introduce the distinction between realization-sensitivity and realization-
insensitivity.51 To say that a correlation between c and e is realization-sensitive is to say that if 
the actual realization base of c were to change even slightly, the correlation would no longer 
hold—ALICE is a realization-sensitive case. In contrast, the correlation between c and e is 
realization-insensitive in the sense that the correlation would still hold if the realization base 
of c were to undergo small change—SOPHIE is a realization-insensitive case. 
If every putative case of mental causation were a realization-sensitive case, mental 
properties would, on my interventionist account, have no genuine causal powers—it is rather 
 
50 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to address this issue. 
51 List and Menzies, “Nonreductive Physicalism and the Limits of the Exclusion Principle,” op. cit.; Woodward, 
“Mental Causation and Neural Mechanisms,” op. cit.; Zhong, “Semantic Normativity and Semantic Causality,” 
op. cit.; and Lei Zhong, “Taking Emergentism Seriously,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, XCVIII, 1 (March 
2020): 31–46. 
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the physical realizers that would do the causal work. This is the picture of Epiphenomenalism, 
in which human agency is nothing but an illusion. But fortunately, the reality is far from that 
depressing. The question of whether mental-physical correlations are realization-sensitive or 
realization-insensitive is largely an empirical question. According to research in psychology 
and neuroscience, the connections between mental states and physical states (such as 
behaviors) seem to be realization-insensitive at least on some occasions.52 Moreover, in the 
literature on mental causation, no one denies that the mental-physical correlation could be 
realization-insensitive—we only disagree over the causal implications of realization-
insensitivity. Some philosophers (mistakenly) believe that mental property M and its physical 
realizer P causally overdetermine the physical effect E, even when M is realization-
insensitive.53 In contrast, according to my interventionist approach, M rather than P should 
be regarded as the cause of E if it is a realization-insensitive case. Consider the following 
four conditionals: 
(a) If an intervention sets M = present (while holding P fixed at absence), then E = 
present; 
 
(b) If an intervention sets M = absent (while holding P fixed at absence), then E = 
absent. 
 
(c) If an intervention sets P = present (while holding M fixed at presence), then E = 
present; 
 
(d) If an intervention sets P = absent (while holding M fixed at presence), then E = 
absent. 
 
Given realization-insensitivity, the conditionals (a), (b) and (c) are true, but (d) is false. Since 
both (a) and (b) are true, M is a cause of E. But because (d) does not hold, P is not a cause of 
 
52 See, for example, Ronald Endicott, “Species-Specific Properties and More Narrow Reductive Strategies,” 
Erkenntnis, XXXVIII, 3 (May 1993): 303–21; Terence Horgan, “Nonreductive Materialism and the Explanatory 
Autonomy of Psychology,” in Steven Wagner and Richard Warner, eds., Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre 
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), pp. 295–320; and Bryan Kolb and Ian Whishaw, Fundamentals of 
Human Neuropsychology, 5th Edition (New York: Worth Publishers, 2003), pp. 621–41. 
53 Woodward, “Interventionism and Causal Exclusion,” op. cit., p. 305. 
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E. That is, the mental property M causes the physical effect E in a non-overdetermining 
way—we can call it the case of Interactionism. Epiphenomenalism and interactionism are two 
types of exclusionism. But unlike epiphenomenalism, interactionism holds the view that 
some physical effects have mental causes (EFFICACY).  
Does interactionism entail the falsity of CLOSURE? It depends. We should distinguish 
between two versions of CLOSURE in terms of a narrow and a broad notion of the physical. 
While physical properties in a narrow sense are fundamental physical properties, properties 
that are investigated by (ideal) physics, physical properties in a broad sense include both 
fundamental physical properties and higher-level physical properties (such as behavioral, 
physiological, and biological properties). Now we can formulate two versions of CLOSURE 
accordingly: 
[NARROW CLOSURE] Every narrow physical effect has a sufficient narrow physical 
cause. 
 
[BROAD CLOSURE] Every broad physical effect has a sufficient broad physical cause. 
According to interactionism, the mental is sometimes a (non-overdetermining) cause of the 
physical. But does the mental cause a fundamental physical property or a higher-level 
physical property? Here it is helpful to make a distinction between Robust Interactionism and 
Modest Interactionism. Whereas robust interactionism claims that the mental can (non-
overdeterminingly) cause fundamental physical effects, modest interactionism asserts that the 
mental can only cause higher-level physical effects (in a non-overdetermining way). In the 
case of robust interactionism, neither NARROW CLOSURE nor BROAD CLOSURE is true; but 
in the case of modest interactionism, although BROAD CLOSURE is false, NARROW CLOSURE 
could still stand. Both robust interactionism and modest interactionism can satisfactorily 
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accommodate mental causation. This general interventionist framework of supervenient 
causation that I advocate leaves it open which version of interactionism is correct.54 
V. CONCLUSION 
Contrary to most interventionists, I propose that a suitable intervention should hold fixed 
the variables in the context of supervenient causation. More specifically, we should hold the 
subvenient property fixed at absence while intervening on the supervenient property, and hold 
the supervenient property fixed at presence while intervening on the subvenient property. This 
approach promises to provide a proper interpretation of both the presence and absence 
conditions and to accommodate the proportionality constraint on causation. My proposal is 
a result of mutual coherence between two sets of theoretical considerations: general 
interventionist requirements on manipulation and fixation on the one end, and particular 
causal verdicts (such as causal judgments about the two pigeon examples) on the other end. 
It is important to note that my account of supervenient causation is neither too permissive 
nor too restrictive: while in some cases subvenient properties rather than supervenient 
properties should be regarded as the causes, in other cases causal efficacy should be 
attributed to supervenient properties instead of subvenient properties. 
  
 
54 In Zhong, “Sophisticated Exclusion and Sophisticated Causation,” op. cit., I develop an autonomy approach to 
mental causation, which is a version of modest interactionism. In my most recent work, however, I argue that 
non-reductive physicalists should reject NARROW CLOSURE for solving the exclusion problem—that is, they 
should adopt robust interactionism. See Zhong, “Taking Emergentism Seriously,” op. cit. 
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